SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
RIMARKS AT PRESS BRIEFING (NOTES PREPARED FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PROPERTY 1963

Mr. McNamara spoke for 52 minutes. It was a realistic special which he gave the views of the United States as to the militar the Alliance is likely to face, at the ways NATO might meet them, at the funds needed to procure and support those forces. Nothing was set that in any way indicates a shift in what we have repeatedly states our policy that we will use whatever weapons are required to protest the vital interests of the Alliance.

Even during the years when the West possessed a little nuclear monopoly, that nuclear superiority did not serve as a universal determinagainst all forms of Communist political and military aggression. Nevertheless, we in the West must maintain nuclear forces so large as the deter the first use of nuclear weapons by our opponents. But it is becoming increasingly clear that such forces by themselves will not prevent less violent acts of political and military aggression. Alliance's foreign policies are to rest on military power which can used in political and military crises of less intensity than those volving the very survival of one or more of its members, then that power must include effective non-nuclear forces and the ability to contrate that power where it is most needed.

The Cuban experience is consistent with this view. In the Cartical area, the United States had superior non-nuclear land, sea and all cores which were quite capable of destroying the Soviet missiles. The States underly between the United States and the Soviet Union was not over the issue of Soviet national survival, the Soviet Union was not prepared to use its nuclear power. And it had no other force it could effectively selve Americans faced a challenge which forced us to support diplomation of the states are effort on both sides to localize the confrontation. And, there was an effort on both sides to localize the confrontation. And, perhaps, most significantly, the forces that were the cutting edge action were the non-nuclear ones. Nuclear force was not irrelevant was in the background. Non-nuclear forces were our sword, our nuclear forces were our shield.

The situation in Europe is, of course, very different. inverted the confrontation in Cuba may throw light on certain of the military political threats which NATO must be prepared to face. Should not be prepared to face.

emphasize more the cases in which its position would be travely end unless we in NATO can apply effective counter-pressure with nations of major attaining nuclear weapons must be used? Against the latter contingencies. The already has very formidable deterrents indeed.

It is quite likely, of course, that the nature of the Jerim has changed precisely because NATO has constructed an adequate it to more ambitious actions. That deterrent will be maintained and strengthened. But he felt that NATO's problems in the Loud's are ly different from those of the late forties.

He referred to some of the events of the past ten years: the suppression of uprisings in East Germany, Poland, and Humman, Signation on a substantial scale to the United Arab Republic and Iraq, and subversion in Africa, pressure on Berlin, and the rash but such that into Cuba.

He said that NATO should expect analogous indirect or direct challenges to the security of members of the Alliance to continue in future and that inaction, or weak action, could result in a serious seck, a missed opportunity, or even disaster.

A review of these contingencies suggests, first, the conlines likely to occur will almost certainly begin in a non-nuclear factor. Second, NATO or some of its members may have to take military content measures. Third, if we can manage local conflicts successfully and a background of increased and adequate strength, we will not have to the remote contingencies. Fourth, our military posture should be as relevant to the likely as to the unlikely contingencies.

This is not to say that NATO should ignore the remote confinences of nuclear or major non-nuclear attack. Quite the contrary. It makes a great deal of sense to prepare for the unlikely - especially when the last of preparation would bring about catastrophic consequences.

He referred to his report in Athens on the nuclear posture of the Alliance, and said that this awesome capability would naturally be the decisive element in any major nuclear war. In its deterrent function remains a necessary - but not sufficient - condition of flexibility and initiative in other realms. The United States, in recognition of these facts, has every intention of maintaining the forces that are required. Plans are also in hand to increase the choice open to the strates of the greatest discrimination possible in the conduct of strategic attacks if these forces should be called in the conduct of strategic attacks if these forces should be called in the

U.S. programs; extending to 1968, provide, within the lines seem technology, timely and coordinated coverage of major strategic from that might threaten the Alliance.

It is the view of the United States, in the light of this asserting that Alliance expenditures in the strategic nuclear field retained for the contingency of general nuclear war and its determination, however, that a basic change is taking place in the nuclear ship between NATO and the Soviet Union. Both sides are their nuclear strength. NATO is and will undoubtedly retain absorbed benefits of this military advantage will be sharply reduced as with those of the 1940's and 1950's.

If military considerations alone were at issue, No. 1972 and would therefore recommend against the further consistent of Alice resources to strategic nuclear forces but, of course, the total resources to strategic nuclear forces but, of course, the total resource military alone. It is political, and its political resource is of the Alice is importance. He said that we in the United States are deep interest having these matters so managed that all members of the Alice is full confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of the Alice is nuclear strength. We fully recognize that this is a problem for the Alliance as a whole and that no single member of the Alliance can should attempt to monopolize responsibility or nuthor; y.

The United States has an inescapable political, legal, and force

responsibility for the management of the avesome power which it controls. It has an equal responsibility to deal faithfully with the chirance its effort to discharge this double responsibility, the United States is seeking to make progress in two major directions.

The first is the expansion of understanding, considering, and

advance planning for the handling of the strategic deterrent. We have a special duty here, and we want to do more to fulfill it. We are a strained atting programs already begun for this purpose, and we are determined search with our partners in NATO for new and stronger instruments of active consultation.

Our second effort is to explore the ways and means by which the alliance as a whole might come to share effectively in the attal oremations, manning, deployment and support of the strategic determent. Shall continue in the effort, and the Secretary made it very clear that in this exploration our central interest is to assist as best we can be deting the legitimate security interests of our European partners in great measure, necessarily, judgment on what is wanted and next a one from our European friends, but we emphasize again our read reserved.

help to the limit in exploring every one of the relevant classical technique, deployment, control, financing, and policy and are readiness to join with others in the necessary action to create a lateral force.

The Secretary said that what we may need in the tactical field is a more difficult question to answer, and it is present suggest specific changes in our tactical nuclear programs. Because the great strategic and tactical nuclear powers already at the discontinuous of NATO, there is time.

He made it perfectly clear that it is the intention of the seasons to maintain and to increase the inventory of tactical number weapons in Europe but he expressed doubt that such weapons are the by which NATO can compensate for non-nuclear weaknesses.

He thought it seemed quite clear that stronger confincted would confer large political benefits on the Alliance, and especiality European members, by giving them a sense of freedom and initiative that primary reliance on nuclear powers does not provide.

In reviewing the prospects for a stronger non-nuclear roster, and discussed the over-all strengths of the two sides. On most over-all measures, he said that NATO worldwide has a position of some sizering in non-nuclear arms over the Warsaw Pact countries. For dwide, it has more men under arms. It has more tactical aircraft worldwide. It has more major combat ships. In terms of basic resources that lear especially on non-nuclear strength, it has far greater industrial resources and manpower. We in NATO are superior in a wide range of the nical skills and our population aggregates 490 million as arminst 320 million. Of course, not all of these resources are directly applicable in any particular locality on short notice. But this is translable in any particular locality on short notice. But this is translable in the Far and Middle East, so do the Soviets. In short, our prospers

The stationing of more U.S. forces in Europe beyond those there now would not solve these problems. The problems of deficiencies and weaknesses must be dealt with by improvements on the European side.

position of operating in a geographically more compact area.

not resources, but the low effectivness of many of our forces, the re-

He then said that there remains the less velocus subject of collis-Although some shifts in the responsibility for current programs in the place over time, matters appear well in hand with respect to the collisions. point where even large additional investment in these capations other hand, the marginal utility of resources spent in the solution of the marginal utility of resources spent in the solution of the heavy costs associated with forming the foundation of a continuous non-nuclear force. Henceforward NATO will obtain greatly effectiveness out of every additional expenditure.

In Secretary said he had already suggested that is in now bearing a heavier share of NATO defense than is going a prudent. It was natural in the early days of NATO that the should carry the major load. But this year the gross rational of NATO members, exclusive of the United States, totals the same against \$507 billion for the United States (neasured at market the state of the NATO Europe countries total around billion as against the \$54 billion of the United States. To proper matter briefly, he thought the United States is more than is in the same an additional defense goals requires that the other NATO countries make an additional effort.

Mr. McNamara said he recognized that per cent of the G.P is called a rough measure of a nation's defense contribution. Revertheless, it is an important indicator of effort. The recent trend in RATO Surere as been to spend a declining per cent of the GNP on defense, while T.Fs have been rising rapidly both in total and per capita. The average is NATO, excepting the United States, in 1956 was 6.7 per cent; in 1912 is was 6.0 per cent.

Another implication is the manpower devoted to defense. At the present time the non-United States members of NATO have on the average lil per cent of their populations under arms. Some have as little as 7 per cent. If all at a lower level were to bring their familiar levels at least to that of the United States, 1.5 per cent, over 1,000,000 per men would be available. He said he was not recommending increases of this magnitude, but he thought there is little doubt that such an increase would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation in the crease would go far to transform the existing power situation.

He concluded by saying that, in sum, NATO has first, a need for the tools for extensive forward non-nuclear action to add to our native posture, and second, the resources to bring such defenses into existence

In the view of the United States, no single step open to NAT : so profoundly affect the strategic balance and enhance the security.

is all, and each of us individually, as the oregion of the foreing and each of us individually, as the oregion of the foreing and each of the foreing and effective introduced for these weapons on hand, NATO shall be better prepared to a column

devastation of a nuclear war.

disastrous choice between a surrender of cur vital interests and the